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This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the effects of income taxation on personal savings in 
Serbia, by taking into account both transmitting channels: the direct impact of capital income tax on 
the rate-of-return and the indirect impact of labour income tax on disposable income. The estimated 
elasticity of bank deposits to the rate of return of 0.3 and the estimated elasticity of employment 
income to a labour tax wedge of –0.38 suggest that income tax function aimed at minimising the 
effi ciency losses should not considerably differentiate the tax burden on labour and capital income. 
We show that in the case of the introduction of a revenue-neutral income tax, with a single marginal 
tax rate of 15% and considerably larger labour income exemption, households’ savings in Serbia 
would decline by 0.27%. This means that the negative impact of a rise in the capital income tax 
wedge on savings would prevail over the positive effects of a labour tax wedge cut. The results 
imply that the overall possibility to boost savings using tax policy is modest.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the post-transition period, economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) was mostly financed by means of FDIs and cross-border loans, since do-
mestic savings were paltry. Starting from 2008, however, the supply of capital in 
the international financial markets deteriorated considerably, leading to a decline 
of capital inflow to these countries. Thus, the average annual FDIs in the CEE 
fell from 7.6% of GDP (2001–2008) to 4.1% of GDP (2009–2012). Cross-border 
loans fell from 24% of GDP in 2008 to 17% of GDP in 2012 (European Invest-
ment Bank 2013). The same occurred in Serbia, where average annual FDIs de-
clined from 7.1% of GDP in the pre-crisis period to 4.9% of GDP in 2009–2012, 
while cross-border loans fell from 35% to 31% of GDP. This has forced the CEE 
countries, including Serbia, to rely more on national savings in financing growth, 
which has brought the issue of savings-promotion policy measures into the focus. 
In that respect, it is often argued that tax policy may be an effective instrument in 
boosting personal savings.
The empirical literature for the OECD countries suggests that income tax has 
a larger negative impact on savings than consumption taxes (Tanzi – Zee 1998). 
According to the theory, wage tax is equivalent to consumption tax in present 
value terms. Consequently, the larger negative impact of income tax (compared 
to consumption tax) on personal savings is assigned to the effects of capital in-
come taxation, which is why the literature on the impact of (income) taxation on 
personal savings was so far mostly focused on the effects of different capital in-
come tax schemes. Under the standard theoretical framework, aggregate personal 
savings are treated as a function of the after-tax rate of return on savings and 
disposable income (Taylor 1971; Peter – Peter 2006). Capital income tax directly 
affects the after-tax rate of return on savings, which is why a design of capital 
income tax was regarded as the fundamental determinant of the savings rate for 
a long time. On the other hand, labour income is the single largest component of 
households’ disposable income. Hence, the reform of labour income taxation can 
also affect the personal savings, since it may alter disposable income. 
Although this is argued in recent theoretical literature (Diamond – Saez 2011), 
the empirical literature on the size of the effects of capital income tax and labour 
income tax on personal savings is scarce. Empirical literature on the magnitude of 
the impact of personal income taxation on households’ savings rate mostly relates 
to developed countries (Bernheim 1999; Huizinga – Nicodeme 2004). According 
to our knowledge, the empirical literature on the effectiveness of tax policy in 
promoting personal savings in transition economies is limited. In addition, this 
question is particularly relevant to the Western Balkan countries because they 
faced the collapse of the banking system during the last decade of the 20th century, 
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which led to the freezing of bank deposits for years (or even decades, as was the 
case in Serbia). Lower confidence in the banking system caused by this experi-
ence may affect individuals’ risk-taking decision patterns, influencing the overall 
effectiveness of tax policy tools in promoting savings in these countries. 
This paper is aimed at estimating the effects of personal income taxation on 
personal savings in Serbia, thus contributing to the literature on the effectiveness 
of tax policy in boosting personal savings and capital accumulation in transition 
economies, with the low level of confidence and risk-adverse economic agents. 
In the estimation of these effects, both the impact of capital income tax and labour 
income tax reforms on savings are taken into account, which is novel compared 
to the methodology applied in the existing empirical literature, usually based only 
on the impact of capital income tax. These effects (of labour income and capital 
income taxes) will be estimated separately, in order to provide the conclusions on 
the optimal mix of labour–capital income taxation from the savings promotion 
perspective, which is the second contribution of the paper. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical frame-
work and literature review. Section 3 describes the current institutional setting for 
personal income taxation in Serbia and the reform scenario. Section 4 presents 
the data, the methodology, and the model. The empirical results are presented and 
discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Unlike classical economic theory, which has regarded capital as one of the two 
growth drivers, neoclassical growth models (such as the Solow model) treat 
growth as an exogenous process, conditional on the increase of the population 
and technological progress, implying that capital accumulation is important only 
in the transition to a steady state. However, the results of empirical studies sug-
gest that there is a strong positive relationship between capital accumulation/
savings and economic growth (Baumol 1989; Serven 2000; Chakrabarti 2006). 
Therefore, the fundamental question is whether (and how) policy measures could 
be efficient in accelerating growth by boosting capital accumulation. The view of 
economic theory on this issue has evolved considerably over time. The Keynesian 
approach relies on “absolute income hypothesis“, according to which consump-
tion is a function of real income and marginal propensity to save, implying that 
tax policy instruments could be efficient in promoting savings. The relationship 
between taxation and savings is further elaborated in the IS-LM model, which 
suggests that an increase in the tax rate moves the IS curve downwards, triggering 
reduction in the savings rate at a certain level of income. In contrast, neoclassi-
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cal economic theory has based its view on “the permanent income hypothesis” 
(Friedman 1957). This hypothesis is based on the assumption of a strong relation-
ship between permanent income and permanent consumption (elasticity close to 
0.9), which suggests a relatively low propensity to save. Under such an arrange-
ment, the potential effects of economic policy (including tax policy) in boosting 
savings are limited (Peter – Peter 2006).
According to the Taylor’s model (1971), aggregate savings (S) is a function of 
the desired amount of wealth (W*) and the existing wealth (W):
  (1)
Desired wealth is a function of disposable income (Y) and the rate of return (R):
  (2)
Equations (1) and (2) suggest that aggregate savings is a function of disposable 
income and the rate of return in the current period. This is the approach frequently 
used in the studies on personal savings behaviour, although other factors (e.g. 
uncertainty) are taken into account in some cases (Peter – Peter 2006). 
Some studies based on this approach show that the difference in capital income 
taxation is one of the primary factors contributing to the divergence in savings 
rates between countries (Carroll – Summers 1987). At the same time, one of the 
largest disagreements in taxation theory is related to the optimal design of capital 
income tax. Opponents of the taxation of capital income claim that capital is an 
intermediary good, and as such should not be taxed (Diamond – Mirrlees 1971; 
Judd 1985 and Chamley 1986). Also, assuming the high elasticity of savings to 
required rate of return, the imposition of capital income tax could trigger a de-
cline in the accumulation of capital, leading to slower economic growth (Mankiw 
et al. 2009). 
Proponents of the taxation of capital income claim that the underlying assump-
tions for zero capital income tax are unrealistic (Diamond – Saez 2011). They 
suggest that it is hard to distinguish between capital and labour income in practice 
(e.g. in the case of self-employment) and that a cut in capital income tax requires 
an increase in labour taxes, which leads to an increase in inequality (since poor 
people more rely on labour income, while capital income is mostly earned by 
middle- and high-income classes). It is also pointed out that there is a positive 
relationship between earning ability and propensity to save, which is why the 
taxation of capital income could contribute to balancing between equity and ef-
ficiency, since capital income distribution properly describes the ability to earn 
distribution. Additionally, it is argued that when there is uncertainty related to 
future earnings, the taxation of capital income discourages savings, which should 
*( ).S W Wφ 
*
1 2 .W Y Rβ β 
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boost labour supply in the future. Chamley (1986) also argues that the taxation of 
capital income may be desirable since it leads to redistribution from high-income 
earners (who are not credit constrained), to low-income earners (who are credit 
constrained), thus promoting entrepreneurship. In addition, Saez (2013) proposes 
the progressive taxation of capital income, with a tax-exempted threshold and a 
single marginal tax rate, arguing that in that way, a fraction of individuals subject 
to capital income tax shrinks to zero. This scheme is regarded as optimal because 
it would trigger a decline in large fortunes until they reach exemption level, thus 
avoiding the infinite distortions problem associated with linear taxation.  
Although the arguments in favour of zero capital income tax have been dis-
cussed for a long time, in practice only one OECD country (Estonia) has exempt-
ed capital income from taxation (Harding 2013). However, in the period from 
1980 until 2005, the average tax rate on dividend and interest income in OECD 
countries declined from 55% to 20%. 
The introduction of, or the increase in, tax on savings income (interest, divi-
dend, capital gains, etc.) leads to the decline in net (after-tax) return on savings, 
the size of this effect being dependent on the elasticity of savings to net return. 
The impact of reduction in the after-tax rate of return on savings is the result of 
an income and a substitution effect. While the decline in after-tax rate of return 
triggers rise in savings under the income effect, savings would decline under the 
substitution effect. Therefore, the economic theory does not provide clear con-
clusions on the impact of capital income taxation on savings (Feldstein 1978), 
which is why the answer to this question is a matter of empirical analysis. While 
earlier studies suggested that the substitution effect prevails (Balassa 1990), some 
of the more recent studies on developed countries claim that no clear conclusion 
on the impact of the interest rate on savings can be made (Bandiera et al. 2000), 
while others argue that the relationship between the interest rates and savings 
is positive, but rather modest (Boskin 1978; Barnheim 1999; Huizinga – Nico-
deme 2004; Hondroyannis 2006). On the other hand, there is an almost gen-
eral consensus in the literature on the positive impact of disposable income on 
personal savings (Boskin 1978; Bandiera et al. 2000; Schmidt-Hebbel – Serven 
2000; Hondroyannis 2006). Most of the studies on this topic focus on developed 
countries, while only a few have been dealing with the developing and the CEE 
countries. Thus, according to Denzier et al. (2000), the determinants of personal 
savings behaviour in three CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland) are 
rather similar to those in developed countries. On the other hand, Bandiera et al. 
(2000) concluded that savings in (seven, non-European) developing countries is 
less sensitive to changes in the interest rates than in developed countries. To the 
best of our knowledge, almost none of the empirical studies have dealt with the 
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sensitivity of personal savings to changes in interest rate and disposable income 
in the Western Balkan countries, although this issue is specific in these countries 
due to the collapse of the banking system in the 1990s and the ensuing lower level 
of confidence/higher risk aversion of economic agents.
3. PERSONAL INCOME TAX IN SERBIA – THE CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL 
SETTING AND REFORM SCENARIO
The existing personal income tax system in Serbia is a combination of the 
scheduler and comprehensive income tax scheme. Within the scheduler com-
ponent, incomes from various sources are taxed at the moment of receipt. All 
incomes are divided into eight categories, each being taxed using different rules; 
the statutory tax rates ranging from 10% (on self-employment and capital in-
come) to 12% (on employment income, with a 5,000 dinars monthly exemp-
tion), 14% (on income from agriculture) and 20% (on other types of income). 
Due to variation in the size of exemptions, eight different effective tax rates are 
applied in the taxation of personal income. In addition to the tax paid at the mo-
ment of the receipt of income, individuals resident in Serbia, whose total annual 
income exceeds a certain threshold, are obliged to pay an annual income tax on 
the amount of income exceeding the threshold, at progressive rates of 10% and 
15%. Capital income is not subject to income tax in order to mitigate double or 
triple taxation. The baseline income tax scheme in Serbia is not neutral from 
the allocation perspective (different types of incomes are treated differently), 
at the same time being complex due to a variety of tax rules. Indices of hori-
zontal and vertical equity in Serbia are considerably lower compared to other 
European countries (Randjelovic – Zarkovic-Rakic 2011). These are some of 
the frequently quoted justifications for the need for a thorough reform of the 
personal income tax in Serbia. 
In order to estimate the impact of an income tax reform on savings, the intro-
duction of a flat income tax scheme will be considered. Under the new tax scheme, 
both labour and capital income would be taxed at the marginal tax rate of 15%. 
Labour income may be decreased by personal and dependent children allowance. 
Personal allowance is increased from 5,000 dinars to 9,000 dinars per month and 
a dependent children exemption of 4,000 dinars per month is introduced. In this 
manner, the statutory tax rates on labour and capital income would rise by 3 and 
5 percentage points, respectively, while the exempted amount would increase by 
80% or more (conditional on the number of dependents). This suggests that the 
overall progressivity of the income tax system would rise – Kakwani’s progres-
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sivity index would rise from 0.11 to 0.18. The reform scenario is revenue neutral, 
in order to ensure the comparability of the baseline and reform scenarios.1 
4. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND MODEL SPECIFICATION
The bulk of gross domestic savings in Serbia is generated by households, the 
share of corporate sector being considerably smaller, while the contribution of the 
government sector is negative (CLDS 2012). This is in line with the theoretical 
considerations according to which the personal savings rate is the determinant of 
the overall savings rate (Sandmo 1985). Due to a shallow financial market and 
underdeveloped life, and a fully-funded pension insurance, bank deposits are the 
key instruments of personal savings in Serbia. In November 2014, the bank depos-
its of the household sector in Serbia amounted to approx. 28% of GDP. The sec-
ond largest personal savings vehicles were housing mortgages, although in 2014, 
they were three times lower than households’ bank deposits. At the same time, the 
total assets of life and private pension insurance funds amounted to 0.5% of GDP 
(National Bank of Serbia, NBS 2014), while the market capitalisation of securi-
ties traded by individuals was negligible. Bank deposits are held not only by resi-
dents of Serbia, but also by Serbians and foreigners living abroad. However, their 
interest income earned in Serbia is not automatically tax exempted. Some of the 
double taxation avoidance agreements with the countries where many Serbians 
live (e.g. Austria) do not prohibit Serbia to tax interest income, while in many 
cases, Serbians living abroad do not ask for tax exemption in Serbia since the tax 
rate is usually lower than in their country of residence. On the other hand, the 
Law on Foreign Exchange Operations prohibits residents of Serbia from keeping 
bank deposits abroad. The aforesaid suggests that the bank deposits can be used 
as a proxy for the overall personal savings in Serbia, while its dynamics could be 
regarded as a determinant of the overall savings rate in Serbia. 
Households’ response to changes in income taxation could be estimated us-
ing the micro-data (based on the cross-sectional variation between households) 
or aggregate macro time-series data. Since the Living Standard Measurement 
Survey (LSMS) 2007 does not contain the data on savings and return on savings, 
the impact of an income tax reform on savings will be estimated using the second 
approach. Starting from the economic theory (equations (1) and (2)), the evalua-
tion of the savings effects of income tax reform is based on the estimation of bank 
1  The revenue neutrality requirement in ex-ante analyses is elaborated and followed in numer-
ous theoretical and empirical studies related to the analysis of the personal income tax reform 
(Decoster et al. 2008).  
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deposits’ elasticity to disposable income and to return on savings. In the next step, 
the impact of the changes in labour income tax on disposable income as well the 
impact of the changes in capital income taxation on after-tax return to savings 
will be estimated. By combining these results, the overall effects of income tax 
on savings are estimated.
Starting from equations (1) and (2), the following basic savings model is es-
timated:
  (3)
We used the monthly data from January 2005 to October 2014 (118 observa-
tions). The dependent variable is the level of euro-denominated deposits in the 
banking sector (DEP), based on the NBS statistics.2 Interest rates (IR) offered 
by the banks to the households (for 1-year euro deposits) are used as a proxy for 
return on savings. Since the Statistical Office of Serbia does not publish monthly 
disposable income statistics, the data on the wage bill and other incomes are used 
as a proxy for disposable income. The wage bill (WAG) series is generated using 
the official data of the Statistical Office of Serbia on the number of employees 
and the monthly data of the Ministry of Finance on wage tax revenues. House-
holds’ survey data suggest that besides the wages, also remittances, pensions, and 
other benefits make up a considerable part (app. 46%) of households’ dispos-
able income. Therefore, the other income (INC) variable is created, summing 
up remittances, pensions, and other benefits. Both the theoretical and empirical 
literature suggests that inflation uncertainty as well the other types of uncertainty 
may play an important role in savings behaviour (Taylor 1971; Wachtel 1977). 
Since most of the bank deposits in Serbia are Euro nominated, while Serbia was 
facing a large depreciation of the national currency to the euro (by app. 51%) 
from January 2005 to November 2014, in addition to the basic model (3), the 
extended model is also estimated, taking into account the exchange rate of the 
Serbian dinar to the Euro (FX) and the harmonised consumer price index in the 
euro zone (HCPI_EU):
  (4)
  
2  The data on euro-denominated deposits will be used since approximately 95% of households’ 
bank deposits are denominated in euro in Serbia.
0 1 2 3log log log log .t t t t iDEP IR WAG INCβ β β β ε    
0 1 2 3log log log log log
log _
t t t t t
t i
DEP IR WAG INC FX
HCPI EU
β β β β
ε
     
 
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Seasonality tests applied to the respective variables (DEP, IR, WAG, INC, FX 
and HCPI_EU) suggest that all variables have a seasonal component, which is 
why the seasonal adjustment of these series (using the Census-12 method) is per-
formed. In order to stabilise the series and to estimate elasticity coefficients, the 
Box-Cox transformation has been performed. 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1. Estimation of the savings model
The choice of the estimation method depends on the stationarity of the respective 
data series, which has been tested using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), 
Dickey-Fuller GLS (DF-GLS), and Philips-Perron (PP) tests. The unit root tests 
suggest that all respective data have one unit root.3
Since all variables are I(1), the long-run elasticity of savings to interest rates 
and incomes may be estimated using the Engle-Granger cointegration method. 
Starting from the initial model specification (equations (3) and (4)), the respec-
tive elasticities are estimated using the OLS method (Table 1).
The cointegrating relationship between the variables is checked through testing 
the stationarity of the residuals from equation 3 (resid3) and equation 4 (resid4).4 
The results of the unit root tests strongly confirm that the residuals from equations 
3 and 4 are stationary, suggesting that the variables are cointegrated. Therefore, 
the estimated coefficients may be interpreted as a long-run relationship between 
the bank deposits and the explanatory variables. The coefficients suggest that the 
interest rate elasticity of households’ deposits equals 0.21, the elasticity to wage 
bill equals 0.73, while the elasticity to the other incomes is higher, amounting to 
1.96. The higher elasticity of savings to other incomes than to wages may be the 
3 The results of the unit root tests are available upon request.
4  The statistical properties of the estimated model and the results of the unit root tests of the 
residuals are presented in Appendices 1 and 2.
Table 1. Results of the savings model estimation using the Engle-Granger cointegration method
Dep. variable Indep.variables
logDEPt const. logIRt logWAGt logINCt logFXt logHCPI_Eut
Coefficients –14.738 0.209 0.728 1.964
–14.98 0.317 0.807 1.747 0.278 –2.502
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consequence of the large remittances, which are used to top-up the basic budget 
of the household (which is why the marginal propensity to save is larger in the 
case of households who receive remittances). The inclusion of the exchange rate 
and the euro zone inflation rate variables triggers only slight changes in the esti-
mated elasticities – the elasticity of deposits to the interest rate rises to 0.32, the 
elasticity to wages rises to 0.81, while the elasticity to other incomes declines to 
1.75. This suggests that the estimated elasticities of the savings to interest rates 
and wages, which are of primary interest to this paper, are robust. 
An additional check of the robustness of the results is done by estimating 
equation (3) using the vector error correction model (VECM). Three information 
criteria (FPE, AIC, and HQIC) suggest that the optimal lag length is two (see 
Appendix 3). The Johansen procedure (using two lags) is applied to estimate the 
number of cointegrating vectors in equation (3). The results show that there is 
one cointegrating vector (see Appendix 4). Based on these results, equation (3) is 
estimated using the VECM approach (Table 2).
The statistical properties of the estimated savings model using VECM are sat-
isfactory. Lagrange multiplier test shows that there is no remaining autocorrela-
tion (see Appendix 3). The eigenvalue stability condition test suggests that the 
number of cointegrating equations is properly specified and that the cointegrating 
equation is stationary. The results of the VECM imply that the interest elasticity 
of savings equals 0.36, while the wage elasticity of savings amounts to 0.64. The 
elasticities estimated using VECM are close to the elasticities estimated using the 
Engle-Granger procedure, which confirms the robustness of the results.
Based on the estimation of the savings model using VECM, the VEC impulse 
response function (IRF) is generated (Figure 1). The IRF suggests that the change 
to the interest rate triggers permanent changes in households’ deposits.
The estimated elasticities of deposits to interest rate (0.21, 0.32, and 0.36) 
are within the range of estimated elasticities in the other 15 countries (ranging 
from 0.2 to 4.5), but being closer to the lower bound (Peter – Peter 2006). This 
is in accordance with the findings of Bandiera (2000), which suggest that the 
elasticity of savings to the interest rate in developing countries is lower than in 
Table 2. Results of the savings model estimation using VECM
Dep. variable Indep.variables
logDEP logIR logWAG logINC const.
Coefficients 0.3592 0.6411 1.4192 –16.1342
Probability (p) 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000
Other statistical
properties
chi2=738.8652; P(>chi2)=0.000);
LM test: p(lag(1))=0.4650, p(lag(2))=0.2049
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developed countries. The lower elasticity of bank deposits to the interest rate in 
Serbia compared to the developed countries may be the consequence of the lower 
confidence of individuals in the banking sector and their higher risk aversion due 
to the collapse of the banking system in the 1990s and the consequent freeze of 
private deposits, which have been converted into public debt and are now being 
paid out in instalments, until 2016. In addition, the lack of viable investment al-
ternatives in Serbia (due to a shallow financial market) may also contribute to the 
lower elasticity of savings to the rate of return. The estimated elasticities of bank 
deposits to the wage bill in Serbia (0.64, 0.73, and 0.81) are close to the results 
obtained in other studies (Boskin 1978; Peter – Kerr 2001). 
5.2. Estimating savings response to the personal income tax reform in Serbia
The change in the capital income tax rate after the tax reform would trigger 
changes in the bank deposits, the level of changes being dependent on the size of 
the changes in the after-tax return to savings and the estimated elasticity of bank 
deposits to the interest rate. At the same time, the change in the labour income 
tax scheme triggers change in the labour tax wedge, which may alter employ-
ment and disposable income. Therefore, in order to evaluate the total effects of 
the income tax reform on savings, it is necessary to estimate the effects of both 
transmission channels (capital and labour income taxation) simultaneously. 
Figure 1. Impulse response of deposits to the shock in interest rate
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a) Estimating the effects of the capital income tax reform on savings
The change in bank deposits due to the capital income tax reform is estimated by 
multiplying the change in the after-tax interest rates on deposits due to the reform 
with the elasticity of bank deposits to the interest rate.5
The results presented in Table 3 suggest that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the 
capital income tax rate from 10% to 15% would trigger a decline of 0.85% in the 
bank deposits in the long run.6
b) Estimating the effects of the labour income tax reform on savings
In Serbia, capital income and labour income are subject to taxation, while other 
incomes (remittances, pensions, and benefits) are tax exempted. Since employ-
ment income represents more than 5/6 of the total labour income, it can be re-
garded as a proxy for individuals’ labour income. The total employment income 
(wage bill) is determined by the level of employment and the average wage. In 
order to estimate the effects of the labour income tax reform on the wage bill, it is 
necessary to calculate the changes in the labour income tax wedge due to the tax 
reform, and to estimate the tax wedge–labour demand elasticity in Serbia.7
The change in the average tax wedge is estimated using the tax-benefit mi-
crosimulation model for Serbia (SRMOD), based on the 2007 LSMS dataset, 
5  An average elasticity of 0.295 is calculated as the mean of elasticities using three different 
specifications of the savings model.
6  It is assumed that the change in the tax wedge would be equally shared between banks and 
household, i.e. 50% of the additional tax wedge would be shifted to depositors, while the re-
maining 50% of the increase in the tax wedge would be borne by banks.
7  Since other incomes (INC variable) are not taxable, the tax reform does not affect the dispos-
able other income, which is why the size of the elasticity of bank deposits to other incomes has 
no direct impact on the results.
Table 3. Effects of the capital income tax reform on savings
Average after-tax interest rate - before the reform 3.996%
Average after-tax interest rate - after the reform 3.885%
Change to the effective interest rates due to the tax reform –2.79%
Elasticity of bank deposits to the interest rate 0.295
Long-run change in the level of bank deposits –0.82%
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encompassing 17,735 individuals.8 Parameters of the reform scenario (described 
in Section 3) are modelled in SRMOD and then the total tax wedge for each indi-
vidual and the average tax wedge for the entire working population is computed. 
According to the results of microsimulation analysis, the tax reform would trig-
ger a decline of 2.01% in the average wage tax wedge (compared to the baseline 
scenario).9  
Since the unemployment rate in Serbia in the sample period was high (rang-
ing from 16.1% to 23.9%), it may be expected that the benefit from the wage tax 
cuts would be shifted to the employers, thus effectively affecting labour demand. 
In that case, the impact of the labour tax reform on total employment income 
can be captured by estimating the elasticity of labour demand to the wage tax 
wedge. The National Employment Bureau (NEB) data on the number of vacan-
cies (VAC) have been used as a proxy for labour demand. Until the end of 2008, 
employers in Serbia were obliged to report all vacancies to the NEB, regard-
less of the manner of recruitment (via NEB or via internal selection processes), 
which is why the sample period ends in December 2008. According to economic 
theory and the empirical literature, the main determinants of labour demand are 
labour costs (wages) and output (Carne 2007; Lewis – MacDonald 2002). In this 
respect, the data on GDP (in 2005 constant prices) have been used as a proxy 
for output, while in terms of labour costs, there were several options available. 
Further to the theory, labour demand could be driven by the minimum wage, 
labour costs, or other indicators highly correlated with them. Since the aim of 
this analysis is to estimate the tax wedge–labour demand elasticity, the monthly 
data on the average wage tax wedge have been used. Wages in Serbia are subject 
to income (wage) tax and social security contributions. The rules for computa-
tion have been changed several times in the sample period: the payroll tax was 
abolished in July 2004, the social contributions rate was increased in September 
2004, a non-taxable threshold was introduced in August 2006, while the wage 
tax rate was reduced from 14% to 12% starting from January 2007. In addition, 
the non-taxable threshold was indexed by CPI at the beginning of each following 
year. Since the tax wedge series (TW) is highly correlated with the total labour 
costs and the minimum wage, the latter two are omitted from the model in order 
to avoid multicolinearity. Standard unit root tests (ADF, DF-GLS, and PP tests) 
suggest that the VAC, GDP, and TW series have one unit root.10 Since all series 
 8  SRMOD is an EUROMOD-based tax-benefit microsimulation model for Serbia. For more 
details on SRMOD, see Randjelovic – Zarkovic (2013).
 9  Although the employment income tax wedge is changed, the reform scenario is revenue neu-
tral due to changes in the taxation of other forms of labour income (self-employment, agricul-
ture, free-lance, etc.) and changes in the taxation of capital income. 
10 The results of the unit root tests are available upon request.
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are I(1), the Engle-Granger cointegration method is used to estimate long-run tax 
wedge–labour demand elasticity, based on the following model: 
  (5)
Using the sample of monthly data from January 2002 until December 2008 (84 
observations), the following model has been estimated:11
 log 5.539 0.378log 0.749log .t t tVAC TW GDP  
Since the variables are I(1), the cointegration relationship is checked by test-
ing the stationarity of the residuals from the estimated model (resid5). ADF, DF-
GLS, and PP tests show that residuals from this cointegration model are sta-
tionary (Appendix 5). Therefore, the E-G cointegration model indicates that the 
estimated long-run elasticity of labour demand to tax wedge equals –0.38, while 
the labour demand–output elasticity equals 0.78. The estimated labour demand 
elasticity is close to the results obtained in other studies, based on panel micro-
data (Žarković-Rakić 2010). 
Since the tax reform would lead to a decline of 2.01% in the labour tax wedge, 
while the estimated labour demand elasticity to the tax wedge equals –0.38, it 
is expected that the labour tax reform would trigger a rise of 0.76% in labour 
demand (Table 4).
Assuming that increase in labour demand would trigger an equivalent rise in 
the employment and wage bill (since unemployment in Serbia is demand driven), 
and taking into account the estimated elasticity of 0.725 of bank deposits to the 
wage bill,12 it is estimated that the labour tax reform would trigger a long-run 
increase in the bank deposits by 0.55%.
11  The statistical properties of the estimated model and the results of the unit root tests of the 
residuals are presented in Appendices 4 and 5.
12  An average elasticity of 0.725 is calculated as the mean of elasticities using three different 
specifications of the savings model.
0 1 2log log log .t t t iVAC TW GDPβ β β ε   
Table 4. Effects of the labour income tax reform on savings
Average change in the labour tax wedge due to the reform –2.01%
Labour demand-tax wedge elasticity –0.378
Average change in labour demand due to the reform 0.76%
Elasticity of bank deposits to wage bill 0.725
Average change in bank deposits due to labour tax reform 0.55%
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c) Estimating the total effects of the income tax reform on savings
The overall effect of the income tax reform on savings equals the sum effects of 
the capital income tax reform and the labour income tax reform. 
The results presented in Table 5 suggest that the positive effects of a decline in 
the labour tax wedge on the households’ disposable income would not be suffi-
cient to fully offset the negative effects of the rise in the capital income tax wedge 
on bank deposits. Therefore, the overall effects of the revenue neutral tax reform 
on savings being negative – it would trigger a decline of 0.3% in the households’ 
savings. However, these results should be interpreted with caution due to several 
reasons. Firstly, if capital income tax incidence is different from the one assumed 
in this study (50:50), the total effects could be different. Secondly, the results are 
highly dependent on the parameterisation of the reform scenarios. Thirdly, these 
results are valid only under the other-things-being-equal assumption. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The question of the effectiveness of public policies in boosting capital accumula-
tion is particularly important when the countries are facing limitations in respect 
of access to capital, a situation Serbia found itself in after 2008. It was then argued 
that the reform of personal income tax, which is motivated by many weaknesses 
of the existing tax system, could also contribute to the rise in domestic savings. 
According to the economic theory, domestic savings is largely determined by two 
groups of factors: the rate of return and personal (disposable) income. In order to 
assess the effectiveness of the government policy in boosting personal savings, 
it is necessary to capture the effects of both transmission channels. This is par-
ticularly the case for the personal income tax reform, which triggers changes in 
the taxation of both capital income and labour income. Empirical studies on the 
effects of the tax reform on savings are numerous, but most of them focused on 
developed countries. Consequently, there is a large gap in the empirical literature 
dealing with the impact of tax policy on personal savings in the CEE countries, 
and particularly in the Western Balkan countries. 
Table 5. Overall effects of the income tax reform on savings
Changes of the bank deposits…
…due to capital income tax reform –0.82%
…due to labour income tax reform 0.55%
Total –0.27%
276 SASA RANDJELOVIC
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
According to our results, the interest rate elasticity of personal savings in Ser-
bia is modest and slightly lower than in developed countries, which could be 
explained by the lower level of confidence and higher risk aversion of econom-
ic agents as well by the lack of alternative savings/investment vehicles. Con-
sequently, the possibility to stimulate savings by means of capital income tax 
cuts are smaller compared to developed countries, particularly when the existing 
capital income tax rate is low and the space for its further reduction is limited. 
The results also suggest that the elasticity of savings to interest rate is close to the 
elasticity of labour demand to the tax wedge (although slightly lower), implying 
that the income tax scheme aimed at minimising efficiency losses should impose 
a similar tax burden on labour and capital income, which is a feature of the flat 
tax scheme. At the same time, this is not necessarily a welfare maximising option, 
due to the adverse distributional effects of such tax scheme.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Statistical properties of the savings model (E-G approach)
dependent var. period: 2005:1-2014:10 (118 obs)
logDEP Equation 3 Equation 4
estimates estimates
logIR 0.2090 0.3166
(0.0158) (0.0035)
logWAG 0.7284 0.8066
(0.0000) (0.0000)
logINC 1.9638 1.7469
(0.0000) (0.0000)
logFX 0.2784
(0.0000)
logHCPI_EU –2.5019
(0.2715)
const. –14.7379 –14.9800
(0.0000) (0.0000)
R2 0.9388 0.9406
adj R2 0.9372 0.9379
F-statistic 583.0347 354.7966
Prob(F-statistic) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Jarque-Bera test (p-value) 0.2314 0.5759
Note: Estimates are given with the corresponding p-values in parentheses.
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Appendix 2. Results of the unit root tests of the residuals from the savings model
cc resid3 resid4
PP
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
t-statistics –7.6512 –6.9517
Test critical values: 1% –3.48705 –3.48705
5% –2.88629 –2.88629
10% –2.58005 –2.58005
Conclusion I(0) I(0)
ADF
p-value 0.0000 0.0089
t-statistics –7.4106 –6.8239
Test critical values: 1% –3.48705 –2.58488
5% –2.88629 –1.94359
10% –2.58005 –1.61491
MacKinnon(2010) critical values: 1% –4.64332 –4.64332
Conclusion I(0) I(0)
DF GLS
t-statistics –6.8817 –6.7016
Test critical values: 1% –2.58488 –2.58488
5% –1.94359 –1.94359
10% –1.61491 –1.61491
Conclusion I(0) I(0)
Conclusion: I(0) I(0)
280 SASA RANDJELOVIC
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
Appendix 3. Statistical properties of the savings model estimated using VECM
Information criteria on the optimal VAR length
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC
0 359.243 2.30E–08 –6.21669 –6.13833 –6.0236
1 733.599 748.71 16 0.000 4.10E–11 –12.5593 –12.3242 –11.98*
2 765.91 64.622 16 0.000 3.1e–11* –12.848* –12.4562* –11.8825
3 780.11 28.4* 16 0.028 3.20E–11 –12.8161 –12.2676 –11.4645
4 788.759 17.297 16 0.367 3.70E–11 –12.686 –11.9808 –10.9482
5 800.791 24.065 16 0.088 4.00E–11 –12.6158 –11.7539 –10.4918
Johansen test for cointegration
Trend: constant No. of obs=116
Sample: 2005m3–2014m10 Lags=2
maximum
rank parms LL eigenvalue trace statistics 5% critical value
0 20 749.24366 59.6476 47.21
1 27 764.95973 0.23736 28.2155* 29.68
2 32 776.09312 0.17466 5.9487 15.41
3 35 778.95308 0.04811 0.2288 3.76
4 36 779.06748 0.00197
Eigenvalue stability condition Lagrange multiplier test
Eigenvalue Modulus lag chi2 df Prob>chi2
1 1 1 15.8284 16 0.46500
1 1 2 20.3504 16 0.20485
1 1 H0: no autocorrelation at lag order
0.6676843 0.667684
–0.468458 + 0.1983434i 0.508717
–0.468458 – 0.1983434i 0.508717
0.1171707 + 0.08141445i 0.142679
0.1171707 – 0.08141445i 0.142679
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Appendix 4. Statistical properties of the labour demand model (E-G approach)
Dep. variable Indep. variable
logVAC logTW logGDP const.
Coefficients –0.378 0.749 5.539
t-statistics –1.894 7.308 6.660
Probability (p) 0.0619 0.0000 0.0000
Other statistical 
properties
adjR2 = 0.783; F = 150.5186 (p = 0.000); 
Jarque-Bera test (p-value) = 0.727, 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test: p = 0.1812
Appendix 5. Unit root tests of the residuals from the labour demand model
resid5
PP
p-value 0.0000
t-statistics –7.3101
Test critical values: 1% –2.59312
5% –1.94476
10% –1.61420
Conclusion I(0)
ADF
p-value 0.0000
t-statistics –7.3172
Test critical values: 1% –2.59312
5% –1.94476
10% –1.61420
MacKinnon(2010) critical 
values: 1% –4.29374
Conclusion I(0)
DF GLS
t-statistics –7.3164
Test critical values: 1% –2.59312
5% –1.94476
10% –1.61420
Conclusion I(0)
Conclusion: I(0)
